Insuring against lifetime cost risks at the point of need

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Aims

- To assess the potential for immediate needs annuities (INAs) to operate in the English care system
- Explore how changes to public funding rules might accommodate greater take-up and the public cost consequences of such changes





Context

- English care system
 - Means-tested public support
 - Asset test
 - Charges in public system based on income
 - Self-pay
 - Pay full care costs out-of-pocket





Point-of-need Insurance – Immediate Needs Annuities

- Insurance available for people who have established (significant) care need
- Insure against the uncertain lifetime cost of care from that point
- Aimed at people moving into residential care (nursing homes)
- Cost: Lump-sum premium (c. £80,000)
- Benefit: Stream of pay-outs to cover care costs that continue until death



What are the pros and cons?

- Advantages: •
 - Risk averse people exchange an uncertain total cost requirement for a certain lump-sum payment
 - Protects people from 'running out of money' if they live longer than expected
 - Avoid chance to have to move to a lower-cost public nursing home
 - Have some certainty about making bequests
 - People are aware that they have a care need and so are more predisposed to buy
- Cons:
 - Insurance-holders penalised by means-tested public care system in England
 - Insurance pay-out income count in the means-test and reduce people's • eligibility for public subsidies

- Affordability is an issue for many
- Does not protect against the risk of needing care



Methods

- Assess potential levels of uptake of INAs
- (1) Affordability test
 - Do people have enough capital to pay INA premiums?
- (2) Net benefit test
 - Are people better off with INAs than without them?
 - Assume that people are moderately risk averse
 - Are people forgoing eligibility for public subsidies by taking out INAs?



Net benefit test

- Because INA-holders may be ineligible for public subsidies...
 - Expected costs of care with an INA might be greater than expected cost without an INA
 - This difference might offset the benefits of certainty...

- i.e. $E[c^{I}] - E[c^{0}] > \tau$, the risk premium

 Most likely to be a problem for people with modest wealth who are close to the capital limits of the public system



Expected costs

- Calculate the annual cost to the individual (= charge – insurance pay-out) for each possible LoS.
- Apply the probability of experiencing each LoS and sum up the probability-weighted cost.
- Then we add the premium which is paid irrespective of the person's actual LoS.
- For an actuarially fair premium, the expected value of the insurance payouts = the premium...
- ... so expected lifetime cost in that case is the weighted sum of charges:

$$E[c^I] = \sum_t c_t^I \rho_t$$



Expected costs can differ

 Without a means-tested public system, the expected lifetime costs of care would be the same with or without an INA

 $-i.e. E[c^{I}] = E[c^{0}]$

- ... and risk averse people buy insurance.
- But charges are not the same
 - (a) INA pay-outs count as income and
 - (b) after the initial INA premium outlay people spend down their assets more slowly because they have additional annuity income.




Expected costs can differ

- The implications of this analysis can be distinguished for three groups of people.
 - (1) High-income
 - These people are unlikely to buy an INA if they can cover most or all of the costs of care using regular income
 - (2) High-wealth, but lower income
 - If wealth is high enough that even a very long-stay in a care home would not exhaust their assets then E[c^I] = E[c⁰] and risk averse people buy insurance.
 - (3) Low-wealth (and low income)
 - If a long-stay means assets would still be depleted and so eligible for public subsidies then $E[c^{I}] > E[c^{0}]$. These people only insurance if $E[c^{I}] E[c^{0}] < \tau$. University of

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
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Stylised experience of person without an INA



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Stylised experience of person with an INA



Solutions

- To increase number who buy insurance...
- Adjust the public system rules:
 - Increase the capital limit for those people with insurance
 - Disregard some/all of the insurance payout in the public charge income test





Assessing possible solutions

- Too complex to model general solutions...
- ... use micro-simulation
- PSSRU Dynamic micro-simulation model
 - Uses pooled sample of 65+ from BHPS
 - BHPS provides exogenous variables: e.g. age, sex, baseline wealth, baseline need(ADLs)
 - Derived variables, calculated using:
 - deterministic relationships: actual rules and features of the current care and support, benefits and tax systems
 - stochastic relationships: behaviours and other stochastic processes that are estimated statistically e.g. demand for care




Results

- We modelled three scenarios
 - S0 No change: Current MT rules with no special allowance for INAs
 - S1: Capital limit increased by the amount of insurance held (initial purchase value of INA)
 - S2: Increased capital limit plus having 50% of INA pay-out income disregarded in the charge meanstest





Numbers of people who could potentially afford and benefit from an INA




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Change in public cost of full uptake of INAs



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Conclusion

- Reconfiguring the public system means-testing rules can make INAs more attractive to people
 - Esp. those people near the capital limits of the public system
- Costs of greater uptake to public system following reform would be modest
- Issues:
 - Assumes actuarially-fair premiums actual premiums would be much higher
 - Concerns potential uptake, not actual uptake
- Financial reform is likely to be a factor in seeing greater actual take-up



